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  Whether Russia believed that a specifi c US missile defense could undermine its deterrent would depend 
on its assessment of how many of its strategic missiles would survive a US fi rst strike and how many of 
those missiles the US defense might be able to intercept. It would also depend on Russia’s assessment of 
the degree of confi dence the United States had in its fi rst strike and defensive capabilities. 
The greatest nuclear 
danger to the United States 
today is a Russian attack 
resulting from error.
This report proposes a nuclear weapons policy for the United States for the next 
decade that refl ects today’s political and strategic realities. By contrast, the offi cial 
policies and doctrines of both the United States and Russia are mired in Cold War 
patterns of thought. Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both countries still 
maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use. Although nuclear war 
plans differ in size and detail from those drawn up 20 or more years ago, their basic 
structure remains unchanged. 
The US nuclear arsenal and doctrine were designed to deter a deliberate large-scale 
Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and a massive Soviet conventional attack on 
US European allies, as well as to preserve the option of a disarming fi rst strike against 
Soviet nuclear forces. This force structure and doctrine are obsolete and jeopardize 
American national security.
The greatest nuclear danger to the United States today and in the near future is 
a Russian attack resulting from an error in Russia’s warning system or a failure in its 
command-and-control system. The current US policy of maintaining large numbers of 
highly accurate nuclear weapons that can be launched promptly to attack Russia’s nuclear 
forces stands in the way of reducing this risk. So too would the US deployment of any 
missile defense system that Russia believes capable of intercepting 
a signifi cant number of its survivable strategic missiles, thereby 
undermining its nuclear deterrent.1
In the longer term, the greatest dangers to US and international 
security stem from the risk of nuclear proliferation. Although 
countries will make their own decisions about acquiring nuclear 
weapons, US nuclear weapons policy can have a substantial impact 
on future nuclear proliferation. By design, current US policy is 
ambiguous about whether US nuclear weapons have purposes beyond deterring other 
countries’ use of nuclear weapons. In addition, US policy includes no significant 
measures to comply with US commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to 
pursue negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons in conjunction with the other nuclear 
weapon states. This creates the strong impression that the United States plans to maintain 
nuclear weapons for the indefi nite future. For these reasons, continuation of the current 
US nuclear policy would ultimately weaken the nonproliferation regime and increase 
the incentives for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons.
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Worldwide verifi able and permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons would greatly 
benefi t the military security of all countries, not least the United States. Accordingly, 
the United States can make a valuable contribution to its national security and that 
of other countries by working to establish the conditions needed to permit such 
enduring prohibition. However, even under the best of circumstances, prohibition of 
nuclear weapons would take far longer than ten years, the period under consideration 
in this report. 
In the meanwhile, the United States should adopt a new nuclear policy that directly 
enhances US national security and that promotes nonproliferation—regardless of 
whether or when nuclear prohibition is achieved. A central element 
of this policy would be a US declaration that the sole purpose of 
US nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use 
of nuclear weapons by another country.
No plausible threat can be foreseen that justifi es the United 
States maintaining more than a few hundred survivable nuclear 
weapons over the next decade or beyond. Nor does any plausible 
threat require the United States to maintain the ability to launch 
large numbers of its nuclear weapons promptly, in a matter of 
minutes, or even in a matter of hours. We recommend that the 
United States unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal to a total of 1,000 nuclear warheads 
and take measures to increase the amount of time required to launch these weapons. By 
easing Russia’s concerns about the potential vulnerability of its nuclear deterrent, these 
steps would give Russia an incentive to adopt a safer nuclear posture for its own nuclear 
arsenal. They would also provide an incentive to other nuclear weapon states to engage 
in multilateral negotiations for deeper, verifi ed nuclear reductions.
The Need for Wider Debate
US policymakers of both major parties recognize that the US nuclear posture must 
change to refl ect today’s world and future challenges to US security. Last year, the US 
Congress passed legislation mandating that the Secretary of Defense conduct a nuclear 
posture review to clarify US nuclear policy for the next fi ve to ten years. This review is to 
be completed by December 1, 2001. Congress specifi ed that the review be broad-ranging 
and that it consider 
• the role of nuclear forces in US military strategy
• the requirements for the United States to maintain a safe nuclear deterrence 
posture
• the relationship among US nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and 
arms control objectives
Even without this requirement, it is clear the Bush administration would have 
initiated such a review. During his campaign, President George W. Bush stated his 
interest in making signifi cant nuclear reductions and in reducing the alert status of 
strategic missiles, indicating a possibility that these reductions might be unilateral. 
He reiterated this interest in his May 1 speech at the National Defense University. The 
administration has indicated that it will complete its review of US nuclear policy and 
make its plans public well before December 2001.
No plausible threat justifi es 
the United States maintaining 
more than a few hundred 
survivable nuclear weapons.
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Thus, there is both a great need and an opportunity to craft a new US nuclear 
policy to enhance US security and move the world in a safer direction. Because nuclear 
weapons are so central to the future security of the United States and the wider 
international community, it is important that US nuclear policy be discussed more 
widely and that decisions about a new US nuclear posture be informed by such broader 
discussions. The three nongovernmental organizations that authored this report have 
for decades been devoted to promoting a sound US nuclear weapons policy and to 
enhancing the public debate over national security issues. In this report, we lay out 
a new nuclear posture for the United States that is achievable in the next decade, to 
encourage an informed debate of US nuclear policy among both US policymakers 
and the public.
A Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade 
Our analysis shows that US security would be substantially improved by adopting a 
nuclear posture for the next fi ve to ten years in which the United States would: 
• Declare that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, 
respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country.
• Reject rapid-launch options, and change its deployment practices to provide for 
the launch of US nuclear forces in hours or days rather than minutes.
• Replace its reliance on pre-set targeting plans with the capability to promptly 
develop a response tailored to the situation if nuclear weapons are used against 
the United States, its armed forces, or its allies. 
• Unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal to a total of 1,000 warheads, including 
deployed, spare, and reserve warheads. The United States would declare all 
warheads above this level to be in excess of its military needs, move them into 
storage, and begin dismantling them in a manner transparent to the international 
community. To encourage Russia to reciprocate, the United States could make 
the endpoint of its dismantlement process dependent on Russia’s response. 
The deployed US warheads should consist largely of a survivable force of 
submarine-based warheads.
• Promptly and unilaterally retire all US tactical nuclear weapons, dismantling 
them in a transparent manner. In addition, the United States would take steps 
to induce Russia to do the same.
• Announce its commitment to further reductions in the number of nuclear 
weapons, on a negotiated and verifi ed multilateral basis. 
• Commit to not resume nuclear testing and to ratify the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. 
• Reaffi rm its commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament and present a specifi c 
plan for moving toward this goal, in recognition that the universal and verifi able 
prohibition of nuclear weapons would be in the US national security interest.
• Recognize that deployment of a US missile defense system that Russia or China 
believed could intercept a signifi cant portion of its survivable long-range missile 
forces would trigger reactions by these countries that could result in a net decrease 
in U S security. The United States should therefore commit to not deploy any 
missile defense system that would decrease its overall security in this way.
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The Future
If this nuclear posture is adopted and its goals accomplished, the United States will 
have greatly enhanced its national security and that of other countries. In addition, it 
will have set the stage for multilateral negotiations to reduce the nuclear arsenals of 
other countries. The next nuclear posture review, undertaken fi ve to ten years from 
now, will then be able to craft a new US policy that will further reduce the whole range 
of nuclear dangers to the United States and other countries. The next nuclear posture 
review will have to tackle new challenges involved in negotiating and implementing 
verifi able, multilateral reductions to levels well below 1,000 nuclear warheads, as well as 
take further steps to lay the groundwork for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
The global security environment has changed profoundly since the end of the Cold 
War. During the Cold War, US policymakers were deeply concerned about the danger 
of a massive, deliberate Russian conventional or nuclear attack on the United States or 
its allies. Today, this danger is acknowledged to be virtually nonexistent. Other nuclear 
dangers to the United States do, however, remain, and new threats could emerge. 
To safeguard the security of its citizens, the US government must protect against 
and reduce current dangers while preventing or minimizing potential future dangers. 
Thus, any nuclear posture review must begin with a realistic assessment of the current 
and potential nuclear dangers to US security, keeping in mind that the nuclear policy 
the United States adopts now will affect the dangers it will face in the future. To an 
extent without precedent since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States can 
now shape the nuclear future. 
Dangers from Russia
While Russia retains the ability to conduct a deliberate nuclear attack against the 
United States, it has no political incentive to do so, and it would, in any case, be deterred 
by the certain US capability to retaliate.
Yet Russia’s nuclear weapons remain the greatest military danger to the United 
States—in consequence if not in probability. Rather than a deliberate attack, the 
danger today is that of a mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental attack. Some of Russia’s 
nuclear-armed missiles could be launched at the United States deliberately, under 
an offi cial order but in response to a mistaken warning of an incoming US attack. 
Such a mistaken retaliatory launch would likely involve a large number of nuclear 
warheads—perhaps thousands. Another possibility is that one or a few individuals 
could seize control of some weapons and launch them, acting without authorization. 
An unauthorized launch would also likely be large, with a plausible launch ranging 
from many tens to several hundreds of warheads.2 Or an accident, due to equipment 
malfunction or operator error, could result in a launch of anything from a single missile 
to a large portion of Russia’s missile force. 
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  One scenario for an unauthorized attack would be the launch of missiles from a single Russian subma-
rine. The Delta IV submarines each carry 64 warheads, and the Delta III submarines carry 48. Another 
would be the launch of land-based missiles under control of a single commander. A Russian regiment 
of SS-18 land-based missiles is typically six missiles with ten warheads each, for a total of 60 warheads. 
However, all Russian land-based missiles in a division are interconnected and can be launched by any of 
the regimental launch control centers or by division command posts and their alternates in the fi eld. A 
regiment commander who devises a way to launch the six missiles under his or her control could also 
fi re all the missiles in the interconnected regiments. Russia maintains four fi elds of SS-18 missiles; each 
has from 30 to 52 missiles, with 300 to 520 warheads. Thus, an unauthorized attack could involve 48 
to 520 warheads.
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Well over a thousand Russian nuclear weapons are deployed on missiles kept on 
high alert and could be launched within a few minutes of a decision to do so. Russia 
maintains this capability so it can launch its nuclear-armed missiles promptly upon 
receiving a warning that the United States has launched—or is about to launch—a 
first strike. Such an immediate launch is intended to prevent its nuclear weapons 
from being destroyed and to ensure the dissemination of launch orders before its 
command centers are destroyed. 
Launch on warning is a risky posture: the decision time is so short 
that it leaves little time in which to rule out a mistaken warning. In 
Russia, the dangers of mistaken launch are exacerbated by a defi cient 
warning system: Russia’s radars do not cover attack corridors from the 
North Atlantic and the Pacifi c where US nuclear-armed submarines are 
normally on patrol. In addition, its satellite-borne sensors for detection 
of missile launches provide incomplete coverage.3 As a result, Russia 
has little ability to cross-check the validity of attack indications from 
one sensor against those of another. Moreover, most of Russia’s nuclear 
forces are deployed in such a way that they would be destroyed in a US fi rst strike. 
Nearly all Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear weapons are on vulnerable missiles: 
land-based missiles in silos, mobile missiles in garrisons, and missiles on submarines 
kept in port. Because of this, Russia has an incentive to react quickly to warning of 
attack and therefore could be fooled by false alarms. Declining morale and training 
in the Russian military further increase the risk of human and technical error in the 
performance of its early warning systems.
Similarly, the United States is prepared for a Russian “bolt-from-the-blue” attack: 
the United States maintains the capability to launch its weapons within minutes of 
receiving coordinated signals from its network of radars and early-warning satellites 
indicating that an attack against the United States is in progress. 
The United States is, however, in a position to keep a more relaxed fi nger on its 
nuclear trigger, for two reasons. First, its warning and communication systems are more 
reliable and suffi ciently complete to provide redundant worldwide coverage. Second, 
the United States maintains more than 1,000 missile-launched nuclear weapons on 
submarines safely hidden at sea. These would survive any Russian fi rst strike. 
Nevertheless, the US policy of maintaining its nuclear forces so they can be 
launched promptly refl ects a predisposition to launch on warning. This posture is 
inherently dangerous—and not only because it could result in a mistaken US launch. 
This posture, in combination with the high accuracy and large number of deployed 
US nuclear weapons, gives Russia an incentive to keep its forces on hair-trigger alert 
to protect its vulnerable nuclear missiles. This, in turn, increases the very real risk of a 
mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental launch of Russian missiles. 
This is not just a hypothetical problem: In 1995, Russia’s early warning system 
indicated a possible US missile attack. This triggered Russia’s emergency nuclear 
decision process—in response to the launch of a scientifi c research rocket fi red from 
3
  One of Russia’s early warning radars was built on Latvian territory. It was dismantled following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Because of its economic diffi culties, Russia has been unable to replace all of 
its early-warning satellites as they age and stop functioning. In 1995, its fl eet included nine functioning 
satellites; now there are only four. These satellites can detect launches of US land-based missiles, but not 
those of US submarine-based missiles.
Launch on warning is a 
risky posture because it 
leaves so little time to rule 
out a mistaken warning.
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Norway. Russia’s radars apparently could not rule out the possibility that the rocket was 
a US nuclear-armed missile fi red from a submarine in the Norwegian Sea. The alarm 
traveled all the way up the chain of command to President Boris Yeltsin, activating his 
nuclear suitcase, which would be used to authorize nuclear retaliation. About eight 
minutes into the rocket launch, the operators of Russia’s warning radars reported that 
the rocket did not threaten Russia, and the alarm was cancelled. 
The safe outcome of this false alarm is scant consolation. The mere fact that a 
peaceful scientific rocket could trigger an emergency launch procedure in Russia 
points to a real danger. Moreover, Russia’s command and early warning systems have 
deteriorated since then: It now has only four early warning satellites; at that time it 
had nine. The next time a benign event is interpreted as a potential nuclear attack, it 
is not clear that Russia will have suffi cient information to decide that it can afford to 
wait. A false alarm involving a single rocket or a small number of incoming warheads 
presumably would not precipitate a Russian decision to launch. However, a false alarm 
could also result in the impression of a massive US attack, in which case Russia may be 
less willing to wait before launching a counterattack. 
Maintaining forces on high alert also increases the risk of unauthorized launches. 
An unauthorized attack is more likely if fewer steps are needed to implement it, as 
would be the case if weapons are primed for rapid launch. With nuclear missiles armed, 
fueled, and ready to fi re upon receipt of a few short computer commands, the need 
for strict safeguards to prevent unauthorized launch is obvious. But no safeguards are 
foolproof, and maintaining nuclear forces in a way that required additional physical 
steps to launch a missile would offer greater protection.
Future Russian Dangers
Russia appears to want to decrease its deployed strategic forces to 1,000 to 1,500 
warheads over the next decade because of economic constraints. However, Russia could 
choose to maintain far more nuclear warheads for the next 15 years if it does not adhere 
to the START II prohibition against land-based missiles with multiple warheads. For 
just this reason, Russia has threatened to ignore the START II agreement in response 
to the deployment of a US national missile defense system that Russia believes might 
be effective against its missiles. 
The danger Russia’s weapons pose to the United States and other countries will 
depend as much—if not more—on their operational status as on their numbers. For 
example, 1,000 Russian nuclear weapons on high alert may pose a much more serious 
risk to the United States than 3,000 that could not be launched quickly.
Tactical nuclear weapons could again become a threat. As a result of NATO 
expansion and the deterioration of its conventional forces, Russia has expressed renewed 
interest in tactical nuclear weapons and could redeploy some of the thousands currently 
in storage. Because tactical nuclear weapons are generally under less secure control 
than strategic weapons, this could increase the risk of unauthorized or accidental 
use as well as the risk of theft. 
Political changes in Russia could also lead to increased nuclear dangers. Russia’s 
transition to democracy may not be completed or may even be reversed in the next 
decade. In such a case, increased tensions between the United States and Russia could 
result in Russia maintaining greater numbers of nuclear weapons at higher alert 
levels. But the revolutionary changes in Europe’s political landscape mean that Russia 
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could not readily reconstruct the conventional threat to central or western Europe 
the Soviet Union once posed. 
Russian Reaction to US Policy
The nuclear policy the United States adopts for the next five to ten years will 
affect the choices Russia will make about its nuclear weapons—regardless of how the 
overall US-Russian relationship evolves over this time period. While the role of 
nuclear deterrence may change in the overall US-Russian relationship over the next 
decade, it is almost certain to continue in some form during this time period. This 
has several implications, both military and political, for how the nuclear threat from 
Russia will evolve. 
Russia is unlikely to try to maintain strict numerical parity at 
a high level with the United States, as the Soviet Union did during 
the Cold War. Nevertheless, domestic political constraints will 
almost certainly keep it from reducing its deployed forces to below 
1,000–1,500 warheads unless the United States does so as well. 
Moreover, Russia is unlikely to reduce its deployed forces to below 
this level if the United States plans to deploy missile defenses Russia 
believes could be capable of intercepting a signifi cant number of its 
strategic missiles that might survive a US fi rst strike. 
More importantly for US security, Russian operational policy will be heavily 
infl uenced by US nuclear doctrine. In particular, whether Russia maintains a launch-
on-warning posture will depend on whether the United States maintains the capability 
to promptly destroy hardened Russian missile silos and deploys missile defenses that 
are worrisome to Russia. 
This linkage between US missile defenses and Russian launch-on-warning policy 
was clearly acknowledged in US State Department talking points used in the January 
2000 US-Russian negotiations over modifying the ABM Treaty to permit deployment 
of the Clinton administration’s planned national missile defense system. The talking 
points argued that the US national missile defense system would not threaten Russia’s 
deterrent as long as Russia continued to deploy 1,000 or more nuclear warheads 
and maintained the ability to launch its forces promptly on warning of an incoming 
US attack.4 
Threats from China
China currently deploys roughly 20 single-warhead liquid-fueled missiles with a 
range capable of reaching the United States. Because the warheads and fuel are apparently 
stored separately from the missiles, the probability of a mistaken, unauthorized, or 
accidental launch from China is low. Mistaken launch in response to false warning of a 
US or Russian strategic attack is also unlikely because China does not have a system of 
early warning sensors to permit it to launch upon detection of an incoming attack.
China could launch a deliberate attack against the United States. However, because 
China clearly does not have a capability to execute a disarming fi rst strike, the United 
4
  “The ABM Treaty ‘Talking Points’: Russia’s Concerns,” on the website of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists at www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/treaty_doc.html#ANCHOR3. See also Stephen I. Schwartz, 
“U.S. Tells Russia: Let’s Keep Nukes Forever—An Introduction to ABM Treaty ‘Talking Points’,” on the 
Bulletin’s website at www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/mj00schwartz.html.
The nuclear policy the United 
States adopts will affect the 
choices Russia will make 
about its nuclear weapons.
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States would still be capable of massive retaliation after an attack. This knowledge would 
certainly deter Chinese leaders from initiating such an attack.
Future Chinese Threats
Over the 20 years since China fi rst deployed nuclear-armed missiles with a range 
that could reach the United States, it has been slowly modernizing its nuclear forces. 
China is apparently developing two solid-fueled road-mobile missiles: the DF-31, with a 
range of about 8,000 kilometers, and the DF-41, with a longer range capable of reaching 
the 48 contiguous United States. The DF-31 was fi rst fl ight tested in 1999 and could 
be deployed within a decade. It is likely to be targeted against Russia and Asia, but 
could reach Alaska. The DF-41 is in early development and could be deployed within 
two decades. 
Because China’s motive for deploying these mobile missiles is apparently to create a 
more survivable deterrent, these missiles are likely to be deployed with their warheads. 
This could increase the risk of an accidental or unauthorized attack, as could the more 
diffi cult command-and-control problems associated with mobile missiles. The risk of 
an unauthorized attack could also be increased if serious political turmoil in China were 
to lead to a loss or weakening of nuclear command and control. 
It is not known whether China is also seeking to deploy an early warning system 
that would give it the capability to launch on warning of an incoming attack. However, 
China’s incentive to acquire such a capability would be reduced if it deploys survivable 
mobile forces. 
A military confl ict over Taiwan is perhaps the most likely scenario in which a 
nuclear confrontation between the United States and China might occur. In order to 
prevent the United States from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf, China could—directly 
or indirectly—threaten to use nuclear weapons. In the words of some American 
commentators, China might force the United States to risk “trading Los Angeles for 
Taipei.”5 But Chinese leaders would expect that a nuclear attack on the United States 
would produce certain retaliation, which would effectively end the Chinese government’s 
existence. For the Chinese leaders, the question would be whether they would be willing 
to trade Beijing for Los Angeles. Such a “trade” would be a signifi cant deterrent to a 
Chinese nuclear attack. China could also threaten to use nuclear weapons against US 
military forces in the region, but Chinese leaders would have to assume that such use 
would prompt the United States to attack all remaining Chinese nuclear weapons, which 
would again serve as a signifi cant deterrent.
Even in the absence of any direct military confl ict, the US-Chinese relationship 
could become overtly hostile, and China might even form a military alliance with 
Russia. 
5
  During the 1996 Taiwan crisis, it was widely reported in the US press that a Chinese offi cial had warned 
that China might threaten Los Angeles with nuclear attack to prevent the United States from intervening 
in a confl ict over Taiwan. In fact, according to the source of these reports, Ambassador Charles W. 
Freeman, Jr., they are based on a misquote of a Chinese military offi cer, Lt. General Xiong Guang 
Kai. In a discussion with Ambassador Freeman, Lt. Gen. Xiong noted that—unlike the 1950s when the 
United States threatened nuclear strikes on China during the Korean War—China now had the ability 
to retaliate, so the United States would no longer feel free to threaten to use its nuclear weapons against 
China in the case of a confl ict over Taiwan. “Did China Threaten to Bomb Los Angeles?” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project Issue Brief, Vol. IV, No. 4, March 22, 2001, 
available at www.ceip.org/fi les/publications/ProliferationBrief404.
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Chinese Response to US Policy
For two decades, China has deployed only a small number of long-range missiles. 
While US nuclear policy is unlikely to affect the nature of China’s modernization 
program, which is motivated by a desire for a more survivable basing mode, it will likely 
affect the number of nuclear weapons China decides to deploy. In particular, the US 
deployment of missile defenses that China believes could intercept a signifi cant portion 
of its long-range missiles will almost certainly spur China to compensate by building 
more missiles, both to overwhelm the defense and to make this capability evident 
to the United States. The August 2000 US National Intelligence Estimate reportedly 
predicted that China would build up to 200 long-range missiles in response to the 
deployment of the limited national missile defense that was being developed by the 
Clinton administration.6 A larger US national missile defense system might generate 
a larger Chinese offensive buildup.
Threats from Other Countries
No other countries currently pose nuclear threats to the United States. However, 
a small number of countries that the US government views as hostile may be seeking 
to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to the United States. These 
emerging missile states—North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—could acquire a small number 
of such weapons in the next decade. 
Whether they do so will be determined by several factors, including their political 
motivations and their relationship with the United States, as well as their access to the 
necessary technology. The latter will depend in part on Russian and Chinese cooperation 
on restricting technology transfers, which in turn will be affected 
by the US-Russian and US-Chinese relationships. 
Even more critical than Russia’s policy regarding approved 
technology transfers is its ability to prevent the unauthorized 
transfer of weapons, materials, and expertise to other countries. 
Russia currently struggles to control up to 20,000 nuclear weapons, 
either deployed or in storage, as well as vast supplies of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons materials and thousands of 
missiles. In addition, tens of thousands of Russian scientists 
and technicians are underpaid and may be tempted to sell their 
knowledge, material, or technology to other countries. As the recent bipartisan study 
cochaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler warned, “The most urgent unmet national 
security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction 
or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile 
nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”7  
6
  The August 2000 National Intelligence Estimate, “Foreign Responses to US National Missile Defense 
Deployment,” is classifi ed. However, several newspaper articles reported on its contents, including  
Steven Lee Myers, “US Missile Plan Could Reportedly Provoke China,” New York Times, Aug. 10, 2000, 
and  Roberto Suro, “Study Sees Possible China Nuclear Buildup,” Washington Post, August 10, 2000.
7
  “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” Howard 
Baker and Lloyd Cutler, Cochairs, Russia Task Force, The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, US 
Department of Energy, January 10, 2000. The report is available on the web at www.ceip.org/fi les/projects/
npp/pdf/DOERussiaTaskForceReport011001.pdf; the appendices are at www.ceip.org/fi les/projects/npp/
pdf/doetaskforceappendices.pdf.
Future threats will depend 
on US-funded cooperative 
programs to help Russia 
control its weapons, weapon 
materials, and expertise.
11The Problem
Thus, the evolution of potential future threats from other countries will also depend 
on the effectiveness of US-funded cooperative programs to help Russia better control 
its weapons, its weapon materials, and its expertise. 
In the longer term, the greatest danger to US, and indeed global, security may 
stem from the failure of the United States and the other nuclear weapon states to 
fulfi ll their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments. Article VI requires these countries 
to take serious steps toward nuclear disarmament. If those steps are not taken, the 
nonproliferation regime could ultimately unravel, resulting in the development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons by states that have the technical capability and fi nancial 
resources to do so. 

Below we describe a US nuclear posture that would address the security problems 
outlined in the previous chapter. First, we briefl y note that the policy we recommend 
will not diminish the US ability to deter or respond to any future Russian or Chinese 
nuclear threat. Even if Russian democracy collapses, or Russia and China develop a 
military alliance, there is no scenario under which the United States will need more 
than a few hundred nuclear weapons to deter or respond to new threats from those 
countries. Moreover, the United States would not benefi t from having the capability to 
launch its nuclear weapons promptly. On the contrary, if any of these negative political 
developments come to pass, US security will benefi t from having reduced the level of 
nuclear confrontation as much as possible in the intervening years.
The nuclear policy we recommend will also not alter US ability to prevent new 
states from acquiring nuclear weapons, or to deter their use. If such states are not 
deterred from attacking the United States by the prospect of retaliation by a few hundred 
US nuclear weapons that could be launched the following day, then they would also not 
be deterred by thousands that could be launched in a matter of minutes. 
Goals of US Nuclear Posture for the Next 5–10 Years
In the absence of profound political transformations, the United States will continue 
over the next fi ve to ten years to maintain the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter 
nuclear attack by other countries against its territory, its armed forces, or its allies. At the 
same time, the United States can and should structure its nuclear policy to achieve two 
main objectives: to decrease the dangers from Russian nuclear weapons 
and to reduce the incentives for nuclear proliferation.
The United States should structure its nuclear policy to reduce 
the risk of mistaken, unauthorized, and accidental Russian launch by 
providing Russia with strong incentives to relax its nuclear posture. 
In so doing, the United States should exploit its unique position as 
the strongest power in all dimensions and take unilateral steps to lead 
the way to a more secure strategic environment. Bilateral US-Russian 
nuclear arms negotiations are bogged down and continuing only along this path will not 
produce results at a pace commensurate with the opportunity and need. Unilateral steps 
to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and their alert levels should be accompanied 
by transparency measures, both to encourage reciprocation on Russia’s part and to 
lay the groundwork for further measures. These should eventually be followed by 
negotiated constraints to codify the progress that has been completed and to make 
it diffi cult to reverse. 
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In addition, US nuclear policy should refl ect the fact that the security of the United 
States, along with that of all other countries, depends upon preserving and enhancing 
the international norms that have developed over the last 50 years against the use and 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. US nuclear weapons policy should be designed 
to sustain the nonproliferation regime and to create pressures and provide incentives 
for non–nuclear weapon states to remain nonnuclear and for nuclear weapon states to 
cooperate on nuclear disarmament. 
To achieve these two objectives, US nuclear policy should also be designed to 
facilitate a broader cooperative relationship with both Russia and China. A cooperative 
US-Russian relationship is needed to permit existing bilateral programs that assist 
Russia in controlling its nuclear weapons and materials to expand and become more 
effective. However, cooperative relations with China and Russia are vital to the success 
of US efforts to encourage these countries to restrict technology transfers to other 
countries. More generally, the three countries could reduce the risks of missile and 
nuclear proliferation if they worked together to do so. US nuclear policy should thus 
serve as an inducement for such cooperation.
Specific Recommendations 
The United States can reduce the threats it faces now and in the future by both 
military and diplomatic means. The nuclear posture we describe below incorporates 
both 
•  military policy governing the deployment, targeting, and conditions for use 
of US nuclear weapons
•  diplomatic policy governing existing and future international agreements 
constraining the testing, deployment, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons 
and the testing and deployment of missile defenses by the United States and 
other states. 
US security would be substantially improved by adopting a nuclear posture for the 
next fi ve to ten years that incorporates the nine elements described below.
 
1.     The United States should declare that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons 
is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another 
country. 
Maintaining and strengthening the fi rebreak against the use of nuclear weapons by 
all countries is a paramount concern for US national security. 
Some have advocated other roles for nuclear weapons than deterring nuclear 
attack, such as 
• deterring or responding to conventional attacks 
• deterring or responding to chemical or biological attacks 
• destroying chemical or biological agents stored in deep underground bunkers 
• deterring or responding to other, often unspecifi ed threats to US vital interests
But adopting roles beyond deterrence of nuclear attack is both unnecessary and 
counterproductive. Such roles would add little or nothing to the deterrence of nonnuclear 
attacks provided by the mere existence of US nuclear weapons or to the US ability to 
counter or respond to such attacks. 
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Such additional roles would also undermine the overriding goal of preventing 
the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. If US policy treats nuclear weapons as 
multipurpose weapons, then other states will be more inclined to seek their benefi ts. If 
the United States, with unquestioned conventional superiority, chooses to rely on nuclear 
weapons to protect and defend its vital interests, then weaker states—particularly those 
not covered by US security guarantees—would apparently have a far greater need for 
nuclear weapons.
Some believe that the consequences of attack from chemical and especially 
biological weapons could be so great that it is unwise to forgo the “sharp deterrence” 
provided by explicit threats to use nuclear weapons in response. Rather than promise 
never to use nuclear weapons fi rst, they advocate a pledge not to initiate the use of 
weapons of mass destruction. No one would question the goal of deterring chemical or 
biological weapon attacks, but explicit US nuclear threats would lack credibility except 
in the most extreme and dire circumstances—circumstances in which 
no prior statement or policy could bolster or detract from the deterrent 
effect that results from the mere possession of nuclear weapons. 
It is often claimed US nuclear threats deterred the use of chemical 
or biological weapons during the Persian Gulf War. But it is worth 
noting that President George H. Bush’s threat of  “the strongest possible 
response” if Iraq used its chemical or biological weapons applied equally 
to the destruction of Kuwait’s oilfi elds, which Iraq did with impunity.8 
US offi cials threatened privately to escalate the war in ways that did not 
involve nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons. Secretary of State 
James Baker warned the Iraqi foreign minister that use of such weapons would lead the 
United States to seek to topple the Hussein regime.9 These threats were almost certainly 
an equally—if not more—potent deterrent than the implicit nuclear threat. There is 
also evidence that US air attacks impaired Iraq’s ability to deploy and use its chemical 
and biological weapons. We do not know why Iraq did not use chemical or biological 
weapons, but the balance of evidence does not support the conclusion that veiled US 
threats to use nuclear weapons were the determining factor.
Nuclear threats are also unnecessary to deter nonnuclear attacks because of the 
great conventional military strength of the United States, which far exceeds that of 
all potential adversaries put together and will do so for the foreseeable future. Any 
nonnuclear threat to the security of the United States and its allies could be countered 
effectively by their combined conventional military strength.
8
  A letter from President George H. Bush to President Saddam Hussein, delivered by Secretary of State 
James Baker to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, stated in the fi nal 
paragraph, “The United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons, support of any 
terrorist actions, or the destruction of Kuwait’s oilfi elds and installations. The American people would 
demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order 
unconscionable action of this sort.” “Confrontation in the Gulf: Text of Letter from Bush to Hussein,” 
New York Times, January 13, 1991. 
9
  US Secretary of State James Baker verbally delivered the following threat to Tariq Aziz on the eve of the 
Persian Gulf War: “If the confl ict starts, God forbid, and chemical or biological weapons are used against 
our forces, the American people would demand revenge, and we have the means to implement this. This 
is not a threat, but a pledge that if there is any use of such weapons, our objective would not be only the 
liberation of Kuwait, but also the toppling of the present regime. Any person who is responsible for the 
use of these weapons would be held accountable in the future.” Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, 
The Gulf Confl ict: 1990–1991 (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 257.
If US policy treats nuclear 
weapons as multipurpose 
weapons, then other states 
will be more inclined to 
seek their benefi ts.
16 TOWARD TRUE SECURITY: A US NUCLEAR POSTURE FOR THE NEXT DECADE
Finally, there are practical political reasons for not using nuclear weapons in 
response to nonnuclear attacks. Although one can imagine cases in which domestic 
pressure for nuclear revenge might be strong, or where the use of nuclear weapons 
might reduce US casualties and end a war more quickly, wise leaders would weigh 
these considerations against the grave damage that nuclear fi rst use would do to US 
security. In the short term, nuclear attacks could turn world opinion against the United 
States and render a collective response against the offender diffi cult or impossible. 
The long-term effects would be more profound. Nuclear strikes could deal a fatal blow 
to US leadership and alliances, wreck the nonproliferation regime, and spur other 
states to acquire nuclear weapons.
 Moreover, threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks 
could increase the pressure for the United States to do so even if it would be counter 
to US interests. First, if the United States maintains its fi rst-use option, the military 
will maintain detailed contingency plans and standard operating procedures for such 
use that could dominate thinking about how to respond in a crisis. Second, once 
policymakers threaten a nuclear response, they might worry that US credibility and 
resolve would be called into question if they did not follow through, even if they believed 
that doing so would be unnecessary or imprudent. 
To summarize, the marginal value of explicit threats to use nuclear weapons to 
respond to nonnuclear attacks is so small, the wisdom of carrying out such threats is so 
dubious, and the potential long-term security costs of making such threats is so great, 
that the United States should make clear that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is 
to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks.
2.     The United States should reject rapid-launch options (launch-on-warning and 
launch-under-attack), and change its deployment practices to provide for the 
launch of US nuclear forces in hours or days rather than minutes. 
By changing its deployment practices so that large numbers of its nuclear forces could 
no longer be launched promptly, the United States would reduce Russia’s incentive to 
maintain its launch-on-warning capability, thereby minimizing the risks of a mistaken, 
unauthorized, or accidental launch of Russian nuclear weapons. A reliable and credible 
US nuclear deterrent does not require that the United States be able to retaliate within 
minutes, so long as no attack could totally disable the US command-and-control system 
and sufficient nuclear weapons are based on submarines, where they would survive 
any attack. 
In the longer term, US security would be further enhanced if the United States worked 
with Russia to develop and negotiate verifi able measures to ensure that neither country 
could launch its missiles in a massive surprise attack.
The only rationale for the United States to maintain its launch-on-warning and 
launch-under-attack options is a belief that doing so provides a more credible deterrent 
to a Russian deliberate attack and therefore reduces the chance of Russia launching a 
deliberate fi rst strike against US nuclear forces. Even if this were valid, such a doctrine 
is not justifi ed in the post–Cold War security environment, where the probability of 
a mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental launch from Russia is far greater than that 
of a deliberate attack.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a rapid-launch posture is necessary 
to deter a fi rst strike, should Russia ever contemplate such an action. Because nuclear 
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weapons are enormously destructive, Russia would be equally deterred by the knowledge 
that at least a few hundred US nuclear weapons would survive any fi rst strike and could 
be launched in retaliation. Because US submarines at sea are undetectable and cannot 
be targeted, the United States will always have a survivable force of nuclear-armed 
missiles as long as it continues to maintain some of its submarines at sea at all times. 
US nuclear command systems may be less resilient and may warrant 
fortifi cation. However, no attacker could assume that destroying key 
parts of the US command system would prevent the United States from 
retaliating with its surviving nuclear weapons.
There are many ways the United States could modify deployment 
of its nuclear-armed missiles so that they could not be launched rapidly 
and so that another country could be confi dent of this. For illustrative 
purposes, we briefl y describe one such option. The United States could 
cover the silos of US land-based missiles with mounds of dirt deep 
enough to prevent launch until bulldozers had cleared away the dirt. This process could 
take several hours for a few missiles and days or weeks for the entire force.
The United States could increase the time required to launch its submarine-based 
missiles by restricting the submarine patrol areas so that it would take days to sail to 
within range of the relevant targets in Russia. In some cases, the United States could 
also add ballast to the missiles to limit their ranges.10 The ballast could be sealed to 
the US missiles with seals provided by Russia, which Russia could check during the ten 
annual random warhead-count inspections allowed each country under the START I 
agreement.11 There are practical ways by which the United States could allow Russia to 
verify US adherence to the limited patrol areas without compromising the survivability 
of the submarines.12
The United States should take such steps unilaterally, so that Russia can have 
suffi cient confi dence to relax its own nuclear posture. Russian silo-based missiles could 
10
The United States plans to replace all its Trident I submarine-based missiles with Trident II missiles by 
2006. The Trident II missile can carry up to eight Mark-4 or eight heavier Mark-5 reentry vehicles, but 
the United States may choose to reduce the number of warheads each missile carries. The United States 
could add ballast to its Trident II missiles to keep their payload at the 2,700 kilograms associated with 
eight Mark-5 reentry vehicles. This would keep the range of the missiles at about 4,100 nautical miles 
(7,600 km). With this range, any missiles on submarines deployed in the Atlantic Ocean could not 
reach the missile fi elds in south-central Russia until the subs crossed a line extending roughly between 
Newfoundland and Morocco. Any submarine-based missiles deployed in the Pacifi c Ocean could not 
reach those same missile fi elds until the subs crossed a line stretching from Anchorage to the southern 
Philippines. (See John R. Harvey and Stefan Michalowski, “Nuclear Weapons Safety: The Case of Tri-
dent,” Science & Global Security 4 (1994), pp. 261–337, particularly Figure 11 on page 306.) The United 
States could restrict its submarine patrol areas by committing to keep its ballistic-missile submarines 
as far away from these lines as they are at the submarines’ home bases. The East Coast base for ballistic-
missile submarines is Kings Bay, Georgia, which is about 3,600 km from the line across the North 
Atlantic. The West Coast submarine base is near Silverdale, Washington, which is about 2,000 km from 
the line across the Pacifi c. At high speed (40 km/hr) it would take a submarine two days (Atlantic) to 
four days (Pacifi c) to travel these distances, so it would take the United States at least four days to carry 
out a launch order from both oceans.
11
START I, Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring, Section IX, “Reentry Vehicle Inspections 
Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty,” and Annex 3, “Reentry Vehicle Inspec-
tions.”
12
Several of the contributors to this report are writing a paper in which several such possibilities are laid 
out and examined.
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be taken off alert by measures similar to that described for the US land-based missiles, 
but different schemes would have to be developed for Russian truck-mobile missiles 
and for Russian strategic submarines.13 It is important that the United States and 
Russia jointly develop verifi able measures that would apply to both countries, but 
the unilateral steps taken by the United States would facilitate the development of 
such measures.
3.     The United States should replace its reliance on pre-set targeting plans with the 
capability to promptly develop a response tailored to the situation if nuclear 
weapons are used against the United States, its armed forces, or its allies. 
During the Cold War, the United States developed a large array of pre-set targeting 
plans for large-scale “counterforce” attacks against Soviet nuclear weapons and other 
targets. These plans could be modifi ed only by months of careful work. Such counterforce 
options are both unnecessary and dangerous. Moreover, it is now possible for the United 
States to plan small-scale retaliatory attacks in far less time.
 Because a deliberate nuclear attack against the United States is implausible and the 
circumstances under which the United States might seriously consider the use of nuclear 
weapons are unforeseeable, preplanned options make little sense. The United States should 
instead create a process of fl exible targeting that would encourage deliberation and facilitate 
the development of options tailored to unanticipated situations.
Counterforce Targeting
Under current US nuclear doctrine, the United States must have the capability to 
destroy more than 1,000 Russian nuclear counterforce targets with the nominal goal 
of limiting damage to the United States should deterrence fail or appear about to 
fail. Targets include hundreds of missiles in silos, launch control centers, and mobile 
missile garrisons; dozens of strategic bomber and submarine bases; hundreds of air 
defense, nuclear weapons storage, and command-and-control targets; and hundreds of 
leadership targets. Under such counterforce targeting, the United States must deploy 
enough nuclear weapons so it can launch two or more warheads at each target to 
increase the odds of destroying it. This results in a requirement for a very large number 
of US warheads. Current US nuclear forces are also highly accurate and carry powerful 
nuclear warheads to give them the capability needed to destroy missiles in silos and 
hardened command-and-control centers. 
Some US defense offi cials are reluctant to endorse deep reductions in large part 
because of their continued attachment to counterforce targeting. However, the harsh 
reality is that counterforce attacks against Russia could not limit damage to the United 
States to any meaningful extent. If Russia did launch a limited attack on the United States 
or its allies, the United States could launch its nuclear weapons at Russia’s remaining 
nuclear forces and its command-and-control centers in an attempt to limit further 
13
Unlike US strategic submarines, Russian submarines do not sail far from their home ports. In fact, 
Russian submarine-based missiles have ranges that allow them to reach US targets while close to port. 
Moreover, Russian submarines based on the Kola peninsula operate in the Arctic Ocean, which is not 
large. Thus, it would be infeasible to reduce the range of Russian submarine-based missiles (by adding 
ballast) so that it would take them several days to sail to the point where they could reach key targets 
in the United States. 
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damage. However, a US counterforce attack would be likely to prompt Russia to launch 
its remaining forces on warning of attack. Even if it did not do so, Russian nuclear forces 
suffi cient to destroy many US cities would almost certainly survive any US attack, even 
if Russian forces were much smaller.14
A preemptive fi rst strike by the United States against Russia 
would be even more reckless—even if deterrence appeared about 
to fail. A fi rst strike could not succeed. It would instead prompt 
Russia to launch all the nuclear weapons it could on warning, 
thus assuring that at least a few hundred nuclear weapons would 
survive the attack, which would be enough to destroy the United 
States.
Moreover, as discussed above, it is dangerous for the United 
States to maintain a large counterforce capability. Doing so 
encourages Russia to deploy its vulnerable forces so that they can 
be launched on warning. This in turn increases the risks of mistaken, unauthorized, or 
accidental attacks from Russia. Today and for the foreseeable future, the greatest danger 
to the United States is from just such attacks. 
The United States should renounce counterforce targeting. But what should 
replace it? 
Other Targeting Options. 
One option is to target cities. Such a “countervalue” doctrine clearly violates 
established international law, which requires that threats or uses of force not be directed 
at civilians. However, the claim that counterforce is superior in this regard rings hollow: 
counterforce attacks, which necessarily would involve a much larger number of nuclear 
detonations and many attacks against targets in or near cities, would also kill millions 
to tens of millions of people. 
Another option is to target conventional military forces and defense industries 
critical to supporting a war effort. This so-called “counterpower” strategy might avoid 
the instabilities associated with counterforce, because neither side would fear for the 
safety of its nuclear force, while offering retaliatory options other than the destruction 
of cities. Targets might include major military bases and storage areas and possibly 
energy infrastructure (refi neries or transmission nodes for gas and electricity) located 
away from major cities. Unlike counterforce, counterpower targeting would require at 
most 100 warheads, enough to hold at risk the most valuable conventional military and 
energy targets located outside cities. 
However, because people live near where they work, even counterpower attacks 
using a small number of nuclear weapons would still result in large numbers of 
14
The two reasons it is not feasible for the United States to use its nuclear weapons to limit damage from 
Russia—that Russia can launch its forces on warning of an incoming attack and that it has enough 
nuclear weapons to be sure that a suffi cient number would survive a US counterforce attack—do not 
hold in the case of China or other countries that might acquire a small number of nuclear weapons in 
the future. If China or another small nuclear power did use nuclear weapons against the United States 
or its allies, the United States could seek to limit further damage by launching a counterforce second 
strike. But even this goal is not achievable. For countries without a launch-on-warning capability, such as 
China, the potential for such a counterforce second strike would almost certainly inspire them to launch 
all their vulnerable forces in the fi rst attack. 
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casualties. Another problem with counterpower targeting is that nuclear attacks against 
conventional military targets could be misinterpreted as an attempt to win a war rather 
than an effort to retaliate to a nuclear attack in ways that minimize the potential for 
further escalation and loss of life. 
Flexible Targeting
There is no easy or general answer to the question of how best—or even whether—to 
use nuclear weapons in retaliation should deterrence fail. Rather than simply replace 
one fi xed plan with another, the United States should not rely on fi xed nuclear war 
plans. The title of the existing US nuclear war plan—the Single Integrated Operations 
Plan (SIOP)—implies a degree of focus and preplanning that is inappropriate. Why 
should the United States rely on detailed plans, which it updates and exercises regularly, 
for massive attacks to destroy Russia on a few minutes notice? Furthermore, such 
preprogrammed war plans are no longer necessary; the technology exists to devise an 
attack and target missiles in a matter of hours. 
Flexible targeting would not mean an end to war planning. Instead, the US Strategic 
Command should be directed to rethink how nuclear weapons might be used within 
the confi nes of the limited role assigned to them and to subject the resulting concepts 
to periodic review by policymakers. At the operational level, the ability to develop 
and execute plans in response to hypothetical scenarios could be exercised regularly. 
As discussed above, several principles should guide such exercises and contingency 
planning: 
• The United States will not use nuclear weapons fi rst. 
• The United States will not use nuclear weapons in haste (no option to launch on 
warning or launch under attack).
• Any response to a nuclear attack will be tailored to the circumstances and will 
be designed to minimize the risk of additional nuclear attacks, particularly 
against cities.
4.     The United States should unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal to a total of 
1,000 warheads, including deployed, spare, and reserve warheads. The United 
States should declare all warheads above this level to be in excess of its 
military needs, move them into storage, and begin dismantling them in a 
manner transparent to the international community. To encourage Russia to 
reciprocate, the United States could make the endpoint of its dismantlement 
process dependent on Russia’s response. US deployed warheads should consist 
largely of a survivable force of submarine-based warheads.
No current or conceivable future threat requires the United States to maintain more 
than a few hundred survivable warheads. The United States should unilaterally reduce its 
arsenal to a total of 1,000 warheads. This would encourage Russia to similarly reduce its 
nuclear forces, without waiting for movement in the US-Russian arms control negotiations, 
which remain bogged down. Further reductions should be made through multilateral 
negotiations; we recommend that US reductions be unilateral only to 1,000 warheads in 
order to induce other nuclear weapon states to join in further reductions. 
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These unilateral reductions should encompass both deployed warheads and those 
kept in reserve, which currently total more than 10,000. Such reductions would transform 
the post–Cold War nuclear security environment, provide Russia with a strong incentive 
to follow suit, and demonstrate US intentions to fulfill its commitments under the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Deterrence and Response
There is no compelling military reason to link the size of US nuclear forces to that 
of other countries, although there may be reason to link its size to the capabilities of 
missile defenses deployed by potential adversaries. As long as the United States has 
enough survivable and deliverable warheads to deter and, if necessary, respond to any 
plausible nuclear attack, it should not matter how many weapons other countries have. 
US weapons can be based and operated so that their survivability 
is insensitive to the size of other arsenals. For example, even a 
10,000-warhead force could not nullify a 100-warhead force based 
on submarines at sea.15 How many of these survivable warheads 
are also deliverable depends on the capability of any missile defense 
systems deployed by potential adversaries. 
How many nuclear weapons does the United States need to 
deter or respond to the use of nuclear weapons? 
Even if the United States rejects countervalue targeting, the capability to destroy an 
attacker’s government and society is the core of deterrence. No sane adversary would 
believe that any political or military advantage would be worth risking the destruction 
of its own society. The delivery of 100 warheads would be suffi cient to destroy the 
society and economy of any country, and tens of detonations could kill more people 
than have ever been killed in any country in any previous war. Thus, 100 deliverable 
warheads should be more than enough to deter any rational leader from ordering a 
nuclear attack on the cities of the United States or its allies. 
It would be suicidal for the United States to retaliate against Russian cities unless 
US cities had already been destroyed. If the United States suffered less than all-out 
nuclear attack and a nuclear response was deemed necessary, the president should have 
options to use nuclear weapons on targets other than an opponent’s cities, in order 
to minimize the probability of escalation. Again, 100 survivable warheads should be 
suffi cient for such contingencies. Against Russia, for example, 100 nuclear explosions 
would be enough to destroy all major air and naval bases, staging areas, command 
centers, and logistics centers that might be used to support a conventional attack.16 
Alternatively, 100 explosions could destroy all major energy and industrial targets 
located outside cities.17 It is, however, diffi cult to imagine that 100 nuclear weapons 
could be used against an opponent, even in a manner that avoided cities, without 
triggering an all-out response; 10 warheads is probably closer to the upper limit of what 
would be interpreted by an adversary as a limited response.
15
Survivable warheads exclude those on silo-based missiles, pier-side submarine-based missiles, and 
bombers not on alert.
16
Roger D. Speed, “Potential CIS/Russian Targets,” UCRL-ID-111040 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory, June 1992).
17
See Speed, “Potential CIS/Russian Targets.”
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Thus, a few hundred survivable and deliverable warheads should be suffi cient for 
the United States to deter or respond to a nuclear attack while retaining enough nuclear 
weapons to continue to deter other countries from attacking. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to specify in detail possible US force postures. 
However if, for example, the United States maintained fi ve submarines at sea, each 
armed with 24 single-warhead missiles, this should be suffi cient to ensure survivability. 
This might require a total of ten submarines, of which half would be in port at any given 
time. US systems for formulating and communicating attack plans to 
the submarines must also be survivable if the United States is to tailor 
any response to the circumstances of the attack.18 Although the United 
States might retain a dozen or so nuclear-capable bombers for special 
missions (e.g., to maintain presidential control up until the last possible 
moment, to be sure that a weapon is used over the intended target, 
or to assess the results of an attack), there is no compelling reason to 
maintain a full triad of forces. The high degree of redundancy in current 
forces is unnecessary for deterrence. 
We advocate that the United States unilaterally reduce its warheads only to 1,000 
at this time, with further reductions to be made through multilateral negotiations. 
With 1,000 warheads, the United States could deploy far more than the 200 survivable 
warheads discussed above. If some 15 percent were designated as “spares,” the United 
States could deploy roughly 800 warheads out of 1,000 total. 
Warhead Dismantlement
Nuclear warheads kept in storage constitute a serious proliferation risk, especially 
under current conditions in Russia. To give Russia an incentive to reciprocate and to 
lay the groundwork for future reductions, the United States should begin dismantling 
its excess nuclear warheads in a manner transparent to Russia and the rest of the 
world. It should commit to storing and disposing of the resulting fi ssile material under 
international safeguards to preclude its reuse in nuclear weapons and to make clear 
that these reductions are irreversible. 
The United States currently has about 
•  7,200 active strategic warheads (those deployed on delivery systems and their 
spares)
•  1,600 inactive strategic warheads (those maintained as a “hedge” to permit a 
rapid increase in deployed weapons and those kept to replace active warheads if 
any develop reliability problems)
•  1,670 tactical warheads
This totals roughly 10,500 nuclear warheads.19 In addition, the United States maintains 
some 12,000 plutonium “pits” from dismantled nuclear weapons at Pantex, of which it 
18
As discussed in Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, ed., Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 110, the United States could establish a secure “strategic mail box” 
that could be accessed by a submarine commander at any time to pick up messages from the national 
command authority.
19
“US Nuclear Forces, 2001,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 57(2), March/April 2001, pp 77-79. Available 
at www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ma01nukenote.html.
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plans to keep 5,000 as a strategic reserve.20 Under our proposal for unilateral cuts to 
a total of 1,000 warheads, the United States would not maintain any additional pits as 
a reserve. Thus, retaining 1,000 nuclear warheads would require that the United States 
dismantle some 9,500 nuclear weapons and dispose of the fi ssile material from some 
21,500 nuclear weapon pits. Dismantling the nuclear weapons would take well over a 
decade and disposing of the fi ssile material is likely to take several decades. To further 
encourage Russian reciprocation, the United States could indicate that completion 
of its dismantlement and disposition process would depend on Russia also placing 
its excess warheads in storage and beginning to dismantle them in a secure and 
verifi able manner. 
5.     The United States should promptly and unilaterally retire all US tactical nuclear 
weapons, dismantling them in a transparent manner. In addition, it should 
take steps to induce Russia to do the same.
If the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to 
the use of nuclear weapons by others, the United States has no need for tactical nuclear 
weapons that could not be fulfi lled by strategic weapons. Because tactical nuclear weapons 
are often stored and deployed under less secure control than strategic weapons, eliminating 
tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the dangers of unauthorized use and theft, 
particularly if Russia reciprocates. 
US tactical nuclear weapons were developed and deployed primarily to defend 
Western Europe from a potential Soviet conventional attack at a time when the United 
States and NATO feared that their conventional forces were much inferior to those of 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer 
exist. Russia poses no conventional threat to Europe, and there is no plausible future 
need for US tactical nuclear forces. In recognition of this fact, in 1991 President 
George H. Bush unilaterally deactivated and began dismantling almost all US tactical 
nuclear weapons. Today, the United States maintains some 1,200 tactical nuclear bombs 
for aircraft delivery at two air force bases in New Mexico and Nevada, about 320 
sea-launched cruise missiles at naval bases in Washington and Georgia, and about 150 
tactical nuclear bombs in various European NATO countries.21
Under the nuclear posture we recommend, the United States would use its nuclear 
weapons only to deter or respond to nuclear attacks. The United States does not need 
tactical nuclear weapons to continue to extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in 
Europe: US strategic nuclear forces would deter nuclear strikes against US allies and 
could be used to respond to such attacks if deterrence failed. 
 President George W. Bush should complete the effort begun by his father by retiring 
all US tactical nuclear weapons and dismantling them in a manner transparent to 
Russia and the international community. Although the United States should make every 
attempt to encourage Russia to reciprocate, it should not make this effort contingent 
on Russian actions.
20
A plutonium “pit” is the core of a thermonuclear weapon that is used to initiate the nuclear explosion. 
“US Nuclear Stockpile,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 54(4), July/August 1998, pp. 69-71. Available at 
www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ja98nukenote.html. 
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6.     The United States should announce its commitment to further reductions 
in the number of nuclear weapons, on a negotiated and verified multilateral 
basis. 
Although US security needs could be met with a few hundred survivable nuclear 
weapons, we recommend that the United States only reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 
weapons at this point. The desire for further reductions would be an important inducement 
for other nuclear weapon states to join in multilateral negotiations to reduce their arsenals 
as well. Negotiated agreements would make reductions more diffi cult to reverse and thus 
provide all nuclear weapon states with the predictability needed to move toward smaller 
nuclear forces and safer nuclear postures. 
If the United States reduces its total nuclear arsenal to 1,000 warheads and Russia 
responds by taking comparable steps, this should not be the endpoint of reductions. 
At this level, the other nuclear weapon states, some of which have several hundred 
warheads, should join in the nuclear reductions process. 
Some analysts argue that the United States should not be party to any legal 
agreements that would limit its future nuclear arsenal. However, the United States relies 
on diplomatic tools and legal agreements in many areas of international competition to 
create and strengthen norms of behavior. Verifi able, legally-binding agreements offer 
an important means for diminishing threats to the United States by constraining the 
behavior of other countries, as well as that of the United States. Arms control agreements 
can provide predictability, transparency, agreed-upon rules, and the avoidance of costly 
and destabilizing arms races. 
7.     The United States should commit to not resuming nuclear testing and should 
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
The United States has a large and varied suite of fully tested nuclear weapons designs 
that give it the capability to meet all credible future military requirements. It also has 
sophisticated facilities for maintaining a reliable nuclear stockpile without explosive 
testing. A US resumption of testing would severely compromise the nonproliferation regime, 
whereas US ratifi cation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would strengthen 
the regime. Since resuming testing would exact an unacceptable political price, the United 
States has nothing to lose and much to gain by ratifying the CTBT. As noted in the January 
2001 report on the treaty by General John Shalikashvili, “an objective and thorough net 
assessment shows convincingly that US interests, as well as those of friends and allies, will 
be served by the Treaty’s entry into force.” 22
Nonproliferation Consequences
In support of US nonproliferation and arms control objectives, the United States 
has been leading the international community toward a global ban on nuclear tests 
since 1993, an effort that originated with a bipartisan congressional initiative in 1992. 
The indefi nite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 was predicated 
on support for the CTBT from the nuclear weapon states as the next major step toward 
22
General John M. Shalikashvili (USA, Ret.), “Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Compre-
hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” January 2001. Available on the website of the US State Department at 
www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt_report.html#report.
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fulfi lling their commitments under Article VI. At the 2000 review conference of the 
NPT, the United States joined the other nuclear weapon states in committing itself to 
secure the entry into force of the CTBT, which can happen only if the United States 
ratifi es the treaty.
If the United States fails to ratify the CTBT and the treaty consequently does not 
enter into force, the United States would be throwing away much of the moral authority 
and international goodwill that has allowed it to lead efforts to strengthen the global 
nonproliferation regime. US failure to ratify the treaty would surely jeopardize the 
increased cooperation needed from non–nuclear weapon states to accept the more 
intrusive international safeguards that were developed after Iraq violated the NPT. If it 
does not ratify the CTBT, the United States would also be unable to pressure other 
states to sign and ratify the treaty. The CTBT would impose upon threshold nuclear 
weapon states a significant barrier to the development of many types of nuclear 
weapons, especially thermonuclear warheads able to meet the volume and weight 
constraints of missile delivery.
Testing Unnecessary
The United States does not need to conduct any more nuclear explosive tests 
to maintain a reliable and safe nuclear arsenal.23 In fact, of the approximately 350 
underground tests the United States has conducted since 1972, only eight were “stockpile 
confi dence tests.” Almost all US nuclear explosive testing has been devoted to developing 
new weapons. Nor does it need to conduct explosive tests to develop new warheads. 
It has a wide range of nuclear warhead designs, which suffice to meet all credible 
contingencies now and into the indefi nite future.
No Additional Constraints
As a practical matter, US ratifi cation of the CTBT will not impose signifi cant 
additional constraints on US testing beyond those that already exist. CTBT opponents 
argue that an unanticipated security threat could emerge in the future that necessitates 
a resumption of US nuclear testing and that this possibility—however small—means 
the United States should stay out of the treaty. We disagree. If the implausible situation 
were to develop in which the United States would fi nd it necessary to resume nuclear 
testing, it would have ample time to invoke the “supreme national interests” clause 
and withdraw from the treaty. 
Because the political price of withdrawal would be high, CTBT opponents question 
whether the United States would actually withdraw from the treaty, once ratifi ed, under 
any circumstances. That argument misses the point. The price of resuming testing 
is already high, and ratifi cation of the CTBT would only marginally increase it. The 
United States has already signed the CTBT. If it resumed testing, the United States 
would alienate all other signatory nations, and the treaty would unravel. Russia and 
China would likely respond in kind, and other nations would not be far behind. The 
nonproliferation regime and US global efforts to strengthen it would be severely 
compromised.
23
See Kurt Gottfried, "Sowing Nuclear Misconceptions," Nature 403(6766), January 13, 2000, pp. 131–133.
26 TOWARD TRUE SECURITY: A US NUCLEAR POSTURE FOR THE NEXT DECADE
8.     In recognition that the universal and verifiable prohibition of nuclear weapons 
would be in its national security interest, the United States should reaffirm 
its commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament and present a specific plan 
for moving toward this goal.
Over the long term, US nonproliferation goals can be accomplished only if the United 
States demonstrates by its own actions and policies that it has reached the fi rm conclusion 
that nuclear weapons bring with them greater dangers than security benefi ts and that it 
intends to move expeditiously toward a nonnuclear world together with the other nuclear 
weapon states. Accordingly, the United States should reaffi rm its commitment to nuclear 
disarmament under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
To facilitate progress toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the United States 
should substantially increase its research efforts on technologies to verify nuclear 
disarmament, and on the types of regimes needed to verify disarmament and to respond 
to potential nuclear rearmament. The United States should also increase its efforts 
to bring about the conditions under which all nations will agree that verifi able and 
enduring prohibition of nuclear weapons is important to their national security. Finally, 
the United States should facilitate the beginning of a multilateral discussion of the 
relevant issues by accepting a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament at the 
Conference on Disarmament and other appropriate forums.
9.     The United States should recognize that deployment of a US missile defense 
system that Russia or China believes could intercept a significant portion of its 
survivable long-range missile forces would trigger reactions by these countries 
that could result in a net decrease in US security. The United States should 
therefore commit to not deploy any missile defense system that would decrease 
its security in this way.
Many questions remain unanswered about the security benefi ts the United States 
could expect to derive from deployment of a national missile defense. The answers 
will ultimately depend on the specifi c details of the planned system and its operational 
effectiveness. However, whether deployment of any specifi c system would be a net security 
benefi t will also depend on the resultant security costs, which could be signifi cant. A US 
commitment to deploy a national missile defense could prevent the United States from 
realizing many of the security benefi ts that would otherwise result from implementing 
the other eight measures above.
As long as the United States and Russia maintain nuclear-armed long-range missiles 
to deter attacks from each other, deployment of a US missile defense system that Russia 
believes could intercept a signifi cant portion of its survivable missiles will stand in the 
way of Russia reducing its arsenals below 1,000 to 1,500 warheads.24 Deploying such US 
missile defenses will give Russia an incentive to maintain a launch-on-warning posture 
for its missiles. Moreover, such deployment will have a chilling effect on the US-Russian 
cooperative programs that are helping to secure Russian nuclear weapons, materials, and 
expertise. This would be contrary to the overall security interest of the United States.25  
24
Russia’s belief may be based on worst-case analysis, which is typical in military planning. 
25
The deployment of even a limited missile defense system could lead Russia to believe it no longer 
possessed limited attack options, in which it could attack a selected target with one or a few nuclear 
warheads, which Russia likely views as an important part of its deterrent. However, in this case Russia 
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US plans for a national missile defense system could also lead to increased dangers 
from China. China will seek to maintain a nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the United States. 
Because its long-range missile force is small, if China views a planned US missile defense as 
capable of intercepting its missiles, it is likely to undertake a larger buildup than it otherwise 
would, with negative regional and international consequences. 
Looking Ahead
By taking the nine steps discussed above, the United States will bring its nuclear 
policy in line with post–Cold War political realities. If Russia responds to these steps by 
reducing its own alert levels and deployed forces, the United States will have signifi cantly 
reduced the nuclear dangers it faces. By ratifying the CTBT and making clear its 
commitment to work toward fulfi lling Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
United States will also have strengthened the nonproliferation regime. By not deploying 
a missile defense system that Russia or China strongly opposes, the United States will 
be able to forge a more cooperative relationship with both countries. This, in turn, will 
facilitate the United States working with Russia and China to constrain proliferation 
and to better secure Russian nuclear weapons and materials. And, by increasing its 
research on the verifi cation of nuclear disarmament and regimes for how to address 
nuclear rearmament, the United States will help create the conditions for the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons.
The United States will also have set the stage for taking further steps toward greater 
security in its next posture review. One such step will be multilateral negotiations on 
deeper, legally binding, verifi ed nuclear reductions that include the other nuclear weapon 
states. Such negotiations will need to encompass both controls on the production 
of fi ssile material for weapons, and the disposition of existing weapon-usable fi ssile 
material. These steps would have profound security benefi ts. They would also constitute 
key parts of a framework for nuclear prohibition and help establish the conditions 
under which prohibition would become politically feasible. 
would likely respond by deploying countermeasures to permit a small number of its nuclear warheads to 
penetrate a limited defense. While this would likely negate any military utility of the US defense, it would 
not necessarily increase the dangers posed by Russia’s nuclear arsenal. More problematic would be the 
US response to a Russian tit-for-tat deployment of a limited nationwide defense.
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